Notes on Oriental Rugs and Persian Rugs by Barry O'Connell

Notes on Ambassador Wendy Sherman

The Honorable Wendy R. Sherman is a woman of incredible talent, integrity and patriotism. She has a long record of admirable successes not just for herself but for America. As Madeleine Albright's strong right hand on North and South Korea she made her mark. Now as the country examines the dire questions of the Bush failure with North Korea nuclear advances it seems like it is time for Bush/Powell to exit and Kerry/Sherman to come in and clean up the Bush mess before some city goes up in a mushroom cloud. Nuclear proliferation is too important to leave to someone who has a tough time spelling "Nuclear proliferation".

Ambassador Wendy R. Sherman is a key foreign Policy advisor to Presidential candidate Sen. John Kerry. Sherman has helped him craft his nuclear proliferation stand as well his over all approach to North Korea.

The Honorable Wendy R. Sherman

Principal, The Albright Group Ambassador Wendy R. Sherman is a Principal of The Albright Group, an international advisory firm. Prior to forming the group, from July 1997 through January 2001, she was the Counselor of the Department of State (DOS), with rank of Ambassador, appointed by President Clinton and confirmed by the United States Senate. Ambassador Sherman served then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as a special advisor and consultant on major issues of foreign policy, provided guidance to the DOS and undertook special assignments. At the same time, she was the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State, and the North Korea Policy Coordinator. Continued... The Honorable Wendy R. Sherman

Ambassador Sherman is the primary architec of the US Government position on the

FROM THE CONGRSSIONAL RECORD

Washington, DC, September 20, 1993.

  • Hon. Lee Hamilton,


Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.

[Page: E2264]
  • Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing in reply to your letter of August 3, addressed to Secretary Christopher. You asked for the Administration's views on a proposed resolution regarding U.S. policy on Iran. The resolution urges, among other things, that the President consider a dialogue with the National Council of Resistance.
  • On the general topic of our policy toward Iran, the Administration's position was detailed by Assistant Secretary Djerejian in his testimony of July 27 before the Committee. That statement of policy remains current.
  • Concerning contacts with Iranian opposition groups, there are numerous such groups in the United States and abroad that do not espouse violence and whose political aims range from supporting a return of the monarchy to establishing a constitutional democracy. Many focus their efforts on Iranian human rights abuses, and work closely with the U.N. Human Rights Committee and private human rights groups. We do meet with representatives of such groups at their request, and believe these contacts are useful as an informational exchange.
  • However, the National Council of Resistance is closely linked to the People's Mojahedin of Iran (PMOI), also known as the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK). Both groups are led by Masud Rajavi. The Administration maintains a policy of no contacts with the PMOI and, by extension, the NCR. This decision is based on our opposition to the PMOI's use of terrorism. Just as we vigorously oppose the Iranian Government's support for terrorism, we do not condone the use of terror and violence in turn by the Mojahedin or any other opposition group. Nor can we forget that U.S. citizens were the victims of PMOI terrorism in the 1970s, or that the group supported the takeover of our Embassy in 1979 and the holding of U.S. diplomats. The PMOI's claim that the organization is not responsible for actions carried out while its current leaders were in jail is a facile one and, in the case of the Embassy takeover, erroneous. As shown in attached 1981 excerpts from the PMOI's own newspaper--published after current PMOI leader Masud Rajavi was released from jail in February 1979--the group fully supported the Embassy takeover and opposed releasing our diplomats. Only in recent years has the PMOI sought to distance itself from its past in order to gain Western support.
  • Other factors support our view that it would be inappropriate to deal with the PMOI/NCR. The National Council of Resistance's claims to be a democratic organization have never been substantiated by its actions. The NCR did, at its inception, include a diverse range of Iranian opposition groups. However, within three years most of the groups that were not controlled by Masud Rajavi had left the organization. According to Ervand Abrahamian's book The Iranian Mojahedin (Yale University Press, 1989), these groups left because the NCR was not democratic, but rather manipulated by Rajavi.
  • In years since, most Iranian opposition groups have continued to refuse cooperation with the NCR. A recent example was a 1992 interview with the late Dr. Sa'id of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (Iran), who denied any links or connections with the PMOI, and said, `In our opinion, our cooperation with the PMOI right now is impossible.' We have no reason to believe the PMOI has become democratic, nor that an Iranian government established by the NCR would be.
  • In a different area, I would note that the PMOI/NCR reporting often contains questionable statements and assertions which do not stand up to later examination. Our intelligence community judges that their reporting is not reliable without validation from other sources.
  • Our own analysis does not support PMOI claims to widespread support inside Iran. The PMOI's military wing, the national Liberation Army, continues to be based in Iraq and retains the support and financing of Saddam Hussein's regime. The PMOI joined Iraqi forces in the eight-year war with Iran. These ties to Iraq have discredited the Mojahedin and NCR in the eyes of many Iranians, and the organization does not represent a significant political force among Iranians.
  • The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.
  • I hope this information is useful to you. Please do not hesitate to call if we can be of further assistance.
  • Sincerely,
  • Wendy R. Sherman,


Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

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Wendy Sherman

CNN LIVE SUNDAY

Interview With Wendy Sherman

Aired December 14, 2003 - 16:34   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

JUDY WOODRUFF, CNN ANCHOR: For the Iraqi people the capture of Saddam Hussein may be the final proof that their long time dictator is gone for good. But what does it mean for the Bush administration's Iraq campaign? Wendy Sherman is with the Albright Group, an international advisory Firm, she also was the counselor at the Department of State with a rank of ambassador during the Clinton administration. Wendy Sherman, thank you being with us.
WENDY SHERMAN, THE ALBRIGHT GROUP: Good to be with you, Judy.

WOODRUFF: To what extent does the capture of Saddam Hussein break the back of the resistance against Americans in Iraq?

SHERMAN: Unfortunately I don't think we know the answer to that question yet. Clearly it is a big morale booster for the Americans. A big morale booster for the Iraqi people, which is the most important. And what I think it brings us is better intelligence, hopefully the calls by the president, by Prime Minister Blair for reconciliation. It will bring the Iraqi people together, and we may see a decrease in the violence. But I think in the short term we may see actually an increase in the violence until all of this sort of weighs on the people and they see where their future is really headed.

WOODRUFF: So does this make it easier for President Bush to accomplish his goal of turning Iraq back over to the Iraqi people, of getting that country back on a stable footing? Or what?

SHERMAN: Well, it certainly takes away the enormous fear that the Iraqi people have had that in fact Saddam Hussein someway somehow is going to come back. That is gone. The shadow is gone. On the other hand, I think we still have insurgents out there. And I think this is an opportunity for the president to internationalize this effort, to take off the made in America label, to really not only bring reconciliation among the Iraqi people but reconciliation around the word. And I hope that when Jim Baker goes off tomorrow on his diplomacy, I hope when the president speaks again that he really brings everybody in and stops drawing lines between the United States and other countries, and starts drawing everyone together.

WOODRUFF: Wendy Sherman, I also want to ask you about the political aspects of this here in this country. Where does this leave the Democratic race for president insofar as Iraq and the aftermath of the war in Iraq was a big piece of that campaign?

SHERMAN: Well, I think it is still a big piece of that campaign, because even though we all hope for success in Iraq, and we hope that success comes quickly, not over the long term, not after the next election but quickly, nonetheless people are still going to ask did it really have to be this difficult? Did we have to go it alone? Did we have to lose so many lives? So there are going to be a lot of questions left to be asked, even if this does help to get Iraq back to the Iraqi people.

So I think Iraq is still there. I think international policy is still there. We have the Middle East conflict, we have Afghanistan, we have the war against terrorism, we have -- President Musharraf almost was assassinated today in Pakistan. Pakistan without a leadership and loose nukes is a problem. We have a lot of problems on the waterfront, a lot to talk about in international relations.

WOODRUFF: So very quickly if you are Howard Dean, or if you're Wesley Clark, and the war has been the central argument for your campaign, are you at least to some extent slowed down by this event today?

SHERMAN: I think what you are is you have to be congratulatory to the president, which both of them were today. You then have to go back to your basic questions, about why did we go in? Is this the best way to make decisions? Is this the way to be commander in chief? And I think those questions will still be on the table. After what is a very good day for the administration and a very good day most of all for the Iraqi people.

WOODRUFF: Ambassador Wendy Sherman, thank you very much. It is always good to see you.

SHERMAN: Good to see you too.

WOODRUFF: I appreciate your dropping by.

SHERMAN: Sure.

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